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BANKS AND BANKING-BANK'S RIGHT OF SET-OFF-DEPOSIT OF FUNDS BY A 
FIDUCIARY-Plaintiff employed A as agent to sell plaintiff's tractor. A was to 
keep any amount received over $5,000. A sold the tractor, receiving a $6,120 
check from the purchaser payable to A. A deposited the check in his per-
sonal checking account in defendant bank. Defendant took the deposit 
without knowledge of plaintiff's interests and applied it against a past due 
obligation of A. Plaintiff brought suit for $4,500, the amount of checks 
from A to plaintiff which defendant refused to pay. The trial court held 
for defendant. On writ of error, held, reversed,1 two judges dissenting. 
No equity was created in defendant superior to that of plaintiff, the bene-
ficial owner of the deposit. Cox v. Metropolitan State Bank, 138 Colo. 576, 
336 P. (2d) 742 (1959). 
It is well settled that a bank has a right to apply the balance of a general 
deposit against a matured indebtedness of the depositor.2 However, the 
authorities disagree as to whether the right exists when the funds deposited 
were held in a fiduciary capacity by the depositor. If the bank has notice 
of the fiduciary character of the funds, there is general accord that the bank 
1 There were avo specially concurring opinions. Sutton, J., concurred on the ground 
that the funds were specially deposited as a matter of law. Frantz, J., concurred on the 
ground that the bank was merely an agent for collection. 
2 In re Milwaukee Commercial Bank, 236 Wis. 105, 294 N.W. 538 (1940); Shuman v. 
Citizens State Bank, 27 N.D. 599, 147 N.W. 388 (1914); Irish v. Citizens' Trust Co., (N.D. 
N.Y. 1908) 163 F. 880. See 5A MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING, perm. ed., §§164, 165 (1950). 
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does not have such a right.a But when the bank is without notice, there is 
a decided split of authority.4 The majority of cases hold that here the right 
exists.5 The minority hold that the right does not exist when the bank has 
no notice unless the bank has changed its position to its detriment.6 The 
principal case, overruling two prior Colorado decisions7 in order to side 
with the minority, demonstrates the need for more adequate analysis. An 
accurate analysis of the availability of the bank's right to apply a general 
deposit against the depositor's matured indebtedness requires first that the 
right be recognized as the right of set-off as distinguished from the banker's 
lien.8 The banker's lien is a possessory right of security which attaches 
only to commercial paper deposited with the bank as bailee for the depos-
itor in the regular course of business.9 The bank's right of set-off, on the 
other hand, arises out of the debtor-creditor relationship which exists in 
the case of a general deposit.10 Absent an agreement otherwise, a general 
deposit transfers title in the funds deposited to the bank, and the bank 
becomes the depositor's debtor for the amount deposited.11 If the depositor 
is indebted to the bank on a matured obligation, the bank may extinguish 
3 Sherts v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 342 Pa. 337, 21 A. (2d) 18 (1941); Union Stock Yards Bk. 
v. Gillespie, 137 U.S. 411 (1890); Cable v. Iowa State Sav. Bank, 197 Iowa 393, 194 N.W. 
957 (1923). Notice can be given by facts sufficient to give actual knowledge or sufficient to 
put on inquiry. Bank of Guntersville v. Crayter, 199 Ala. 599, 75 S. 7 (1917). 
4 See cases collected in 50 A.L.R. 629 (1927); 31 A.L.R. 756 (1924); 13 A.L.R. 324 (1921). 
oArnold v. San Ramon Valley Bank, 184 Cal. 632, 194 P. 1012 (1921); Shuman v. 
Citizens State Bank, note 2 supra; Kimmel v. Bean, 68 Kan. 598, 75 P. 1118 (1904); Smith 
v. Des Moines Nat. Bank, 107 Iowa 620, 78 N.W. 238 (1899); Hatch v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 
147 N.Y. 184, 41 N.E. 403 (1895). See also 2 TRUSI'S REsTATEMENT SECOND §324, comment 
j (1959); 2 SCOTT, TRUSI'S §324.4 (1956); 5A MICHm, BANKS AND BANKING, perm. ed., §136 
(1950). 
6 This is the so-called "federal" or "equitable" rule. Agard v. Peoples Nat. Bank, 169 
Minn. 438, 211 N.W. 825 (1927), quoted at length in the principal case at 747; Shotwell v. 
Sioux Falls Sav. Bank, 34 S.D. 109, 147 N.W. 288 (1914). These cases claim the leading 
case of Metropolis v. New England Bank, I How. (42 U.S.) 234 (1843), affd. on second 
appeal 6 How. (47 U.S.) 212 (1848), as authority. But see note, 38 HARv. L. REv. 800 
(1925). There is some authority to the effect that not even a change in position by the 
· bank will allow it to prevail over the beneficial owner of the funds. Burtnett v. First 
Nat. Bank, 38 Mich. 630 (1878). But cf. Garrison v. Union Trust Co., 139 Mich. 392, 102 
N.W. 978 (1905). 
7 Expressly overruling Boettcher v. Colorado Nat. Bank, 15 Colo. 16, 24 P. 582 (1890), 
and modifying the opinion in Sherberg v. First Nat. Bank of Englewood, 122 Colo. 407, 
222 P. (2d) 782 (1950). But consider that out of seven judges, only three were content 
with the majority opinion. And cf. Italian American Bank v. Carosella, 81 Colo. 214, 254 
P. 711 (1927), not mentioned in the opinions. 
8 See Irish v. Citizens' Trust Co., note 2 supra. Many cases fail to recognize the dis-
tinction. The origin of the two rights are different. The banker's lien had its origin in 
the Law Merchant, while the right of set-off can be traced to the civil law. See note, 11 
CALIF. L. REv. 111 (1922). 
9 See Irish v. Citizens' Trust Co., note' 2 supra. See also BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, 
2d ed., 577 (1955). 
10 Kimmel v. Bean, note 5 supra; Shuman v. Citizens State Bank, note 2 supra. In the 
case of a special deposit, where the bank is a bailee, the bank properly has a lien and not 
a right of set-off. 5A MICHm, BANKS AND BANKING, perm. ed., §118 (1950). 
11 See, e.g., White v. Pacific S. W. Trust and Sav. Bank, (D.C. D.C. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 
650, modified (9th Cir. 1934) 15 F. (2d) 300; Shuman v. Citizens State Bank, note 2 supra. 
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the mutuality of indebtedness by "setting off" its debt with the amount of 
the depositor's debt.12 Set-off is well established as a protective right ac-
corded to debtors.is It is not dependent upon the creditor's assent.14 
Thus, to determine accurately the availability of set-off to the bank, the 
assent of a depositor should not be required beyond the act of making a 
general deposit, by which the depositor objectively manifests15 his assent 
to the transfer of title and the debtor-creditor relationship. It is well estab-
lished that a transferee for value in good faith takes title to money16 and 
negotiable instruments17 free and clear of prior legal and equitable inter-
ests18 of third parties. If the bank can qualify as a transferee for value of 
a general deposit when it has no notice of the depositor's fiduciary capacity, 
set-off should be available to the bank unimpaired by prior interests in the 
funds deposited. Standing alone, the act of crediting the depositor's ac-
count with the amount of the deposit does not constitute a giving of value 
by the bank.19 However, if the bank ex.tends credit to a general depositor 
without notice of the depositor's fiduciary capacity and in reliance upon 
having the right of set-off, the bank is protected even under the minority 
rule.20 The bank has given value by extending credit.21 But an antecedent 
debt also constitutes value. One who takes money or negotiable instruments 
in satisfaction of an antecedent debt is a transferee for value.22 To the ex-
tent that the bank applies23 a general deposit in good faith to discharge a 
depositor's debt via the right of set-off, the bank gives value for the deposit, 
and such an application should not later be defeated by third parties whose 
12 See note 2 supra. 
13 See note, 11 CALIF. L. REv. Ill (1922). Set-off is established by statute in many states. 
14E.g., Gunn v. Stock Yards State Bank, 97 Kan. 404, 155 P. 796 (1916). 
15 See, e.g., Gunn v. Stock Yards State Bank, note 14 supra; Meyers v. N.Y. County 
Nat. Bank, 36 App. Div. 482, 55 N.Y.S. 504 (1899). 
16 The leading case is Stephens v. Board of Education, 79 N .Y. 183 (1879). 
17The primary authority is NIL, §57. The transferee of a negotiable instrument must 
meet the requirements of a holder in due course as set out in NIL §52. 
18 Because the transferee who qualifies takes free of both legal and equitable interests, 
it makes no difference that the transferor was a trustee, bailee, agent, custodian, or thief. 
19 Cases are collected in BEUTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, 7th ed., §25, 
p. 498 (1948). Note the cases contra cited therein at p. 499, and see comment, 33 YALE L.J. 
628 (1924). 
20 The extension of credit is clearly a change in position within the meaning of the 
minority rule. 
21 "Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." From NIL, §25. 
3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., §747 (1941). 
22 Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842); Stephens v. Board of Education, note 16 
supra; Spaulding v. Kendrick, 172 Mass. 71, 51 N.E. 453 (1898); NIL, §25. See also com-
ment, 46 MICH. L. REv. 211 (1947); BEUTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 7th 
ed., §25, p. 514 (1948). 
23 Since a taker of security for an antecedent debt is usually a transferee for value, 
consideration should also be given to the possibility that the general deposit may be treated 
as security for an antecedent debt. See Wood v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 129 Mass. 358 (1880). 
This would move the time of giving of value up from the time of set-off to the time of 
deposit. If NIL, §27 protects the banker's lien on a special deposit from the time of de-
posit, should not the right of set-off be protected from the same time in the case of a 
general deposit? Cf. 2 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT SECOND §323, comment c (1959). 
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prior interests were unknown to the bank at the time of application.24 The 
purpose of the rule that an antecedent debt is value is to augment the 
policy that commercial paper should circulate with maximum fluidity25 by 
eliminating subjective inquiry into whether the transferee had changed his 
position on the antecedent debt.2 6 In view of the uniform recognition that 
an antecedent debt is value, the requirement of the minority view that the 
bank prove a change in position despite the existence of the depositor's 
antecedent debt seems inappropriate. Since this area fairly demands a 
greater degree of predictability, it is hoped that more adequate recognition 
will be given to the bank's qualifications as a transferee for value in good 
faith when the bank's right of set-off is threatened by prior interests of 
third parties. 
James Blanchard 
24 See the cases cited in note 5 supra. 
25 This is the policy underlying the corpus of the law of transfer of commercial paper. 
Miller v. Race, I Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (1758); Stephens v. Board of Education, 
note 16 supra. 
26 Strahom, "The Policy or Function of the Law of Bills and Notes, Part II," 87 UNIV. 
PA. L. REv. 793 at 795 (1939). See also Swift v. Tyson, note 22 supra; comment, 33 YALE 
L.J. 628 (1924). 
